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The dissent's view that the Court treated the substantive area with
hostility seems justified.59 Whether future opinions will attempt to limit
the "injury in fact" construction of Warth to exclusionary zoning cases is
conjectural, though it is likely in light of the trend of cases prior to
Warth and the peculiarly volatile consequences of applying this trend in
a zoning context. The impact of Warth on zoning litigation is not likely
to be severe. State courts are becoming increasingly receptive to prob-
lems of economic exclusion, and arguably every plaintiff that has litigat-
ed this issue in the federal courts to date would have found a more
favorable forum in state court. Warth may have a larger impact in the
area of equal protection, given the constraints it places on bringing cases
in federal court that raise this issue in an economic context.
It might be noted that Warth was the wrong case to appeal if the
goal were to establish an economic equal protection doctrine. There
should have been a history of repeated project denials and plaintiffs who
would have been able to live in the projects had they been built. 0 The
consequences of bringing Warth before the Court are a number of
restrictive precedents in both standing law and the use of the equal
protection doctrine that if followed will have an adverse impact on
creative developments in both these areas. Unfortunately, given the
context of Warth in the series of standing decisions and the restrictions it
imposes on future zoning cases, it is not at all certain that the Court will
reassess its .holding in the near future.
WILLIAM W. DREYFOOS
Constitutional Law-The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine
From 1972 to 1974, the conclusive presumption doctrine' surfaced
as a viable vehicle for Supreme Court invalidation of legislation. The
doctrine requires nearly perfect conformity between the results of the
59. 95 S. Ct. at 2216.
60. See the Court's discussion. Id. at2209 n.16.
1. "Conclusive presumption" will be used interchangeably with "irrebuttable pres-
umption." See Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer
Equal Protection Continues, 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 217, 220 (1975), where the internal
inconsistency of the terminology is described.
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means used and the legislative ends intended to be attained.2 Its use
has generated concern both on and off the Court due to its capacity,
when applied, to strike down almost any legislative classification, a
concern reminiscent of the fears generated by the old substantive due
process decisions.3 In Weinberger v. Salfi4 the Court declined to apply
conclusive presumption analysis5 and called on another line of cases
utilizing a "mere rational relationship" test to validate subsections
216(c)(5) and (e)(2) of the Social Security Act (Act).6
Plaintiffs Salfi and her daughter applied for Social Security insur-
ance benefits upon the death of Salfi's husband of nearly six months, a
wage earner covered by the Act.7 The definitions of "widow" and "child"
in subsections 216(c) (5) and (e) (2) deny benefits, in the absence of
other enumerated factors, to surviving wives and stepchildren whose
legal relationships to the wage earner were in existence for less than nine
months." After being denied benefits initially and on reconsideration,
plaintiffs brought suit in district court challenging the constitutionality
of the classifications. The district court applied conclusive presumption
analysis and found for the plaintiffs.9 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed. 10 The high Court first rejected conclusive presumption analy-
sis and decided that only one constitutional claim was available to the
Salfi plaintiffs." The Court held that the plaintiffs' only assertable
claim was that the eligibility requirement was "not so rationally related
to a legitimate legislative objective that it can be used to deprive them of
benefits available to those who do satisfy that test."' 2  The majority,
however, concluded that the duration-of-relationship requirement is a
rationally based prophylactic rule, insulating the system from abuse.
13
2. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L Rav. 1534, 1534-36 (1974); text accompanying notes 17 and 42 infra.
3. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463-69 (1973) (Rehnquist, Burger, and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Simson, supra note 1, at 226-27. The doctrine is strongly
criticized in Note, 87 HARV. L. REv, supra note 2. One problem is that any statute can
be rephrased as an irrebuttable presumption. Simson, supra note 1, at 225-26; Note, 87
HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1549.
4. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
5. Id. at 771-73. The Court analyzed a jurisdictional issue at length before
reaching the merits. Id. at 756-67.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c) (5), (e)(2) (1970).
7. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 963 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
8. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c), (e) (1970).
9. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
10. 422 U.S. at 785.
11. Id. at 771-72.
12. Id. at 772.
13. Id. at 777.
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An understanding of Salfi is aided by an examination of other
Supreme Court decisions that have applied or rejected conclusive pre-
sumption analysis. In Salfi, the majority distinguished three conclusive
presumption cases that the district court had relied upon." In the first
of those cases, Stanley v. Illinois,'" the State denied unwed fathers a
hearing on fitness to raise their children while allowing all other parents
a hearing when their custody was challenged. 16 The Court found that
the statutory scheme constituted an irrebuttable presumption that unwed
fathers are unfit to raise their children and declared it unconstitutional."7
The presumption was held unconstitutional because the legislative pre-
sumption that all unwed fathers are unfit parents was unreasonable.1 8
The embryonic irrebuttable presumption analysis of Stanley took
on additional form in Vlandis v. Kline." In Vlandis the Supreme
Court held that
[S]ince Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in al-
locating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is
forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resi-
dent rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presump-
tion of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or
universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alterna-
tive means of making the crucial determination.20
The invalidated statute2' had conclusively presumed that married stu-
dents were not bona fide residents if they were living outside of the state
at the time of application and that single students were not bona fide
residents if they had lived outside of the state at any time during the
previous year. 2
The third case relied upon by the district court, Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,13 represents the culmination of the major irre-
buttable presumption cases. The challenged rule in LaFleur required a
pregnant school teacher to quit her job and to go on leave without pay
five months before the anticipated birth.24 The school board claimed
14. Id. at 771-72.
15. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
16. Id. at 649-50.
17. Id. at 656-59.
18. Id. at 654-59.
19. 412U.S. 441 (1973).
20. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
21. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1975).
22. 412 U.S. at 442-43.
23. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
24. Id. at 634. The regulations further stated that, "A teacher on maternity leave
is not allowed to return to work until the beginning of the next regular school semester
which follows the date when her child attains the age of three months." Id. at 634-35.
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that one of the purposes of the rule was to keep unfit teachers out of the
classroom.2 5 The Court invoked the conclusive presumption doctrine to
invalidate the rule since the presumption that teachers within five
months of childbirth are physically unfit is "not necessarily or universal-
ly true."
'26
Another Supreme Court case mentioned in Salfi was United States
Department of Agriculture v. Murry.17 Murry applied conclusive pre-
sumption analysis to invalidate a provision of the Food Stamp Act that
was designed to prevent non-needy households from abusing the sys-
tem. 8 The statute prohibited issuance of food stamps to households
that included a person claimed as a tax dependent by a non-needy
household.29 Although not specifically reciting the "universally true"
test, the Court did cite Vlandis and Stanley30 in finding the statute
unconstitutional because of its presumption that the households affected
by the statute were in fact non-needy." ' Oddly, in Salfi, the Supreme
Court cites Murry as authority for the proposition that "Congress may
not invidiously discriminate among . . . claimants . . . on the basis of
criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal."
32
The Salfi majority's interpretation of Murry as a "rational relation" case,
rather than a conclusive presumption case, made it unnecessary to
distinguish the Court's application of the more stringent standard in
Murry.
The conclusive presumption approach had also been specifically
rejected in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Salfi. In Mourning
v. Family Publications Service, Inc.33 a regulation promulgated under
the Truth in Lending Act was challenged as an unconsitutional conclu-
sive presumption. The regulation made the disclosure requirements of
the act applicable whenever a loan was to be repaid in more than four
installments.34 Since the act requires disclosures by those who extend
credit to consumers and impose a charge for financing,35 the regulation
25. Id. at 641. The other purpose was to maintain continuity of classroom
instruction. The Court concluded that the rules had "no rational relationship to [that]
valid state interest." Id. at 643.
26. Id. at 646.
27. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
28. Id. at511-14.
29. Food Stamp Act of 1964, § 5(b), 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970). The tax
dependent had to be eighteen years of age for the statute to apply.
30. 413 U.S. at 513-14.
31. Id. at 511, 514.
32. 422 U.S. at 772.
33. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
34. Id. at 362; 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1975).
35. 411 U.S. at 361; Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970).
1976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
was attacked as creating an irrebuttable presumption that credit pay-
ments in more than four installments involve a finance charge.8 0 The
Court rejected this argument, saying:
The rule was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not pre-
sume that all creditors who are within its ambit assess finance
charges, but rather, imposes a disclosure requirement on all mem-
bers of a defined class in order to discourage evasion by a substan-
tial portion of that class.37
In Marshall v. United States"8 the Court, applying the rational
relationship test, upheld provisions of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1966 that excluded addicts with two or more felony convic-
tions from rehabilitative commitment in lieu of penal incarceration."
The dissenting justices thought that the rule amounted to a conclusive
presumption which was not necessarily true, that is, that multiple felony
offenders are less likely to be cured by treatment. 40
Another rejection of irrebuttable presumption analysis came in
Sosna v. Iowa,41 a case which, like Vlandis, involved a residency re-
quirement. The challenge in Sosna was to a statute that required the
petitioner in a divorce action to have resided in the state for a year prior
to commencing the proceedings.42 The Court held that a reasonable
durational residency requirement in this situation was permissible, citing
language from Vlandis.43 The Court drew a distinction between a
requirement which causes delay (Sosna) and one which causes total
deprivation (Vlandis)."
The Supreme Court decided Salfi against this backdrop of cases
that either applied or specifically rejected conclusive presumption analy-
sis, as well as a line of equal protection cases.45 Under conclusive
presumption analysis, the goal of the statute must be exactly the result
obtained by implementation of the means adopted. That is, the classifi-
36. 411U.S.at363.
37. Id. at 377.
38. 414U.S. 417 (1974).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 4251(f)(4) (1970).
40. Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred with Justice Marshall's dissent. 414
U.S. at 430.
41. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
42. Id.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (Supp. 1975).
43. 419 U.S. at 409-10.
44. Id.
45. The Court has based its conclusive presumption reasoning on due process,
though the commentators have argued that it really is, or should be, a type of equal
protection analysis. See generally Simson, supra note 1; Note, 87 HAnv. L. REv., Supra




cation that creates the alleged presumption must be neither overinclusive
nor underinclusive. Such exactness is virtually impossible to attain by
statutory classification; only individualized hearings, which are mandat-
ed when the Court decides that a statute is an unconstitutional irrebutta-
ble presumption, can theoretically attain such precision.46
The problem, then, in conclusive presumption cases is not that the
avowed purpose is illegitimate, but, rather, that the means employed to
reach that end are imperfect. The doctrine has been applied when
legislative means infringe important individual rights, and when. the
governmental interest advanced is, by comparison to those rights, insub-
stantial.4 7 The cost and administrative difficulty of individual hearings
is generally to be considered in assessing the weight of the governmental
interest, 48 but this consideration standing alone does not prevent appli-
cation of the fatal irrebuttable presumption analysis.49
In LaFleur and Stanley, the individuals' interests were very strong
(freedom of choice in family matters, and custody of children, respec-
tively) and the governmental interest sought to be advanced by classifi-
cation rather than individualized hearings was comparatively weak. In
Mourning (right to extend credit), Marshall (right to civil rehabilita-
tion), and Sosna (right to divorce), the individuals' interests were not as
significant. Furthermore, the statutes and regulations involved in the
latter cases merely infringed upon the individuals' interests rather than
depriving them of their rights. As a result, the conclusive presumption
doctrine was not applied.
The statute in Salfi can be read as constituting an irrebuttable
presumption that those widows who married wage earners within nine
months of their decease married to obtain Social Security benefits rather
than to enjoy the "traditional benefits of marriage.""0  Moreover, the
statute completely deprives the individual of the right to receive bene-
46. A possible exception to the requirement of extreme precision is found in
Murry, 413 U.S. at 514, where the Court found the presumption to be "often contrary to
fact."
47. Id. at 518 (Marshall, J., concurring); text following note 49 infra. This is not
unlike Marshall's "sliding scale" analysis which he has articulated in a number of
concurring and dissenting opinions. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973). See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 458-59
(White, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Salfi v. Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 781-82; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at
451.
49. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 646; Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. at 451; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.
50. 373 F. Supp. at 965.
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fits.5 ' Nevertheless, the Court felt that irrebuttable presumption analy-
sis was inappropriate because the only right the plaintiffs claimed was a
right to non-contractual social welfare benefits.r2 The Salfi majority, by
categorizing Murry as a "rational relation" case could ignore the fact
that that case applied conclusive presumption analysis to a type of social
welfare. 5 ' Instead, the Court relied on Dandridge v. Williams, 14 a case
applying a rational relationship test to validate social welfare legisla-
tion which set a maximum limit on welfare grants regardless of the
size of the family receiving the benefits.55
The individuals' rights affected in Salfi were not substantial enough
to trigger conclusive presumption analysis.5 Nevertheless, the statute
could still have been invalidated under the rational relation test as
applied. Salfi did not follow the extremely deferential approach of
Dandridge.5 7  The approach taken was similar to that of Jiminez v.
Weinberger,5 another social welfare case, in which, although the Court
claimed to apply a "mere rationality" test,5" the statute fell. The
judicial scrutiny in Jiminez and Salfi apparently involved what the
commentators have termed "rationality with bite."00  Dandridge was
distinguished in Jiminez because the governmental interest in Dandridge
was much stronger; a finding of unconstitutionality would have threat-
ened the entire program-" In Jiminez, not only was the governmental
interest less compelling, it was apparent that the critical determination
51. Id.
52. 422 U.S. at 771-72.
53. See text accompanying and following note 32 supra.
54. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
55. 422 U.S. at 769-70.
56. Id. at 771-72. This insubstantiality was accentuated by comparison with the
magnitude of the difficulty of administering individual hearings. See id. at 781-82 & n.13.
57. The depth of the analysis the Court applied in Salfi was reflected, perhaps, by
the verbalized requirement that the statute be "so rationally related .... " (emphasis
added). Id. at 772. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
58. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
59. Id. at 632. The challenged statute denied Social Security benefits to illegiti-
mate children born after the wage earner became disabled unless they could inherit under
state law or were legitimized or were illegitimate only because of some formal defect in
their parents' marriage. The Court said the law was unconstitutional if "the classifica-
tion [was] justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise." The Court
did recognize a legitimate governmental interest, but did not defer to legislative discretion
in effectuating that interest. Rather, the majority found no reasonable relation between
the classification and its purpose. Id. at 636.
60. The premier article concerning intermediate scrutiny is Gunther, Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972). In connection with Gunther's article, see Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), a recent example of "rationality with bite."
61. 417 U.S. at 633.
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could have been made more accurately by individualized hearings than
by the statutory scheme. 2 In contrast, the Salfi plaintiffs failed to show
that individualized hearings or any rule other than the nine month
requirement could more effectively filter out sham marriages.
6 3
The weakest part of the Salfi opinion is the distinguishing of
Vlandis on the grounds that "the Social Security Act does not purport to
speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then
make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissable." 64  On
the contrary, that would seem to be precisely the Act's effect. The
Court even states that the purpose of the nine month requirement as
revealed in the legislative history is to insulate the system from those
who marry with the intent to defraud the Social Security system.6 5
Whether or not the Act literally speaks of the bona fides of the parties
should not matter; in fact, the statute in Vlandis did not refer, literally,
to the bona fides of the party claiming residency.60
The only logical interpretation of the language quoted above is that
the Act is concerned with the bona fides of the parties and that "plainly
relevant" evidence means "objective" evidence. Thus, the basis for
sustaining the Vlandis challenge, but not the Salfi challenge, should
have been the existence of objective evidence bearing on the bona fides
of the parties in Vlandis, and the Court would have adequately ex-
plained the different results. The correctness of the result in Vlandis
does not explain the application of conclusive presumption analysis in
that case. The Court should have admitted that unless the challenged
statute in Vlandis is viewed as infringing the right to travel, which it was
not,67 the individual interest was not sufficient to invoke the conclusive
presumption doctrine. Arguably, the Supreme Court ought to have
accorded Vlandis the same level of scrutiny as Salfi and Jiminez, as all
three cases involved a type of non-contractual public benefit, (Social
Security in Salfi and Jiminez, reduced tuition in Vlandis). The statute
in Vlandis could still have been declared unconstitutional under the
62. The critical determination was whether or not the child was, in fact, dependent.
A hearing on dependency would be less likely to exclude dependents or include non-
dependents than the challenged statute. Id. at 634-38.
63. 422 U.S. at 782-84. See especially id. n.15.
64. Id. at 772. Justice Rehnquist probably meant: The Social Security Act does
not (1) purport to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage and (2)
then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissable. See also id. at
803 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 777-80. Accord, 373 F. Supp. at 965.
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1975).
67. If the right to travel was in the contemplation of the Court, they did not
express it. 412 U.S. 441.
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rational relation test because objective criteria existed that could have
been easily utilized to make a more accurate determination of residen-
cy 68
Thus the meaning of Salfi is twofold. First, in the area of Social
Security, the individual interest affected, even when there is a total
deprivation of benefits, will be insufficient to trigger conclusive pre-
sumption analysis. This will be particularly true when the rule has a
prophylactic effect, insulating the system from substantial abuse, since
the governmental interest will be correspondingly great. Secondly, the
Court may find a given classification to be rationally related to the
legislative goal in spite of a fairly close examination of the statute. The
factor crucial to such a finding is the unavailability of other methods
that would clearly yield a more accurate result. Other means were not
proven to be available in Salfi; the statute was therefore validated as a
legitimate exercise of legislative discretion. To deprive Congress of the
power to enact statutes, albeit admittedly imperfect, to protect public
welfare systems from abuse when other effective means are unavailable
would be, indeed, to quote from an earlier opinion of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, "an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself.""0
WILLIAM H. HIGGINS
Constitutional Law-The First Amendment Status of Commer-
cial Advertising
In the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,1 the United States
Supreme Court stated that the Constitution does not prohibit regulation
of "purely commercial advertising."' Although the statement was not
the basis for the Court's decision in that case, it spawned the widely
accepted doctrine3 that "commercial speech" is not protected by the first
68. Such criteria included voter registration, driver's license, car registration, prop-
erty ownership, place of filing tax returns, and year-round homes. Id. at 448.
69. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. Id. at 54.
3. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 384-85 (1973); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1960) (dissent); Breard v.
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